# Streaming, Sharing, Stealing: Big Data and the Future of Entertainment

Michael D. Smith Hollywood IT Society Fall Conference

### Carnegie Mellon University



Does piracy harm sales?

Does piracy hurt creative output?

Do Long Tail markets change consumer preferences?

Does HBO cannibalize DVD sales?

What is the right price for online movie sales?

How valuable is targeted promotion online?

Do site shutdowns change piracy behavior?

Do graduated response efforts increase legal sales?

Do early digital releases cannibalize DVD sales?

Can Google search results change piracy?

Does theatrical attendance help DVD sales?

Does legal online streaming hurt EST sales?

Does site blocking change piracy behavior?

Do delayed international DVD releases hurt sales?

#### Does piracy harm sales?

Does piracy hurt creative output?

Do Long Tail markets change consumer preferences?

Does HBO cannibalize DVD sales?

What is the right price for online movie sales?

How valuable is targeted promotion online?

Do site shutdowns change piracy behavior?

Do graduated response efforts increase legal sales?

Do early digital releases cannibalize DVD sales?

Can Google search results change piracy?

Does theatrical attendance help DVD sales?

Does legal online streaming hurt EST sales?

Does site blocking change piracy behavior?

Do delayed international DVD releases hurt sales?

### Does Piracy Harm Sales?

#### Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals Articles

No	Yes	

### Does Piracy Harm Sales?

#### Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals Articles

No (3)	Yes
Oberholzer and Strumpf (2007, J. of Political Economy) Smith and Telang (2009, MIS Quarterly) Andersen and Frenz (2010, J. of Evolutionary Economics)	


### Does Piracy Harm Sales?


#### Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals Articles

No (3)	Yes (22)	
Oberholzer and Strumpf (2007, J. of Political Economy) Smith and Telang (2009, MIS Quarterly) Andersen and Frenz (2010, J. of Evolutionary Economics)	Hui & Png (2003, Contrib. to Economic Analysis & Policy) Peitz & Waelbroeck (2004, Rev. of Econ. Res. on Copyright) Zentner (2005, Topics in Econ. Analysis and Policy) Stevens and Sessions (2005, Journal of Consumer Policy) Bonnie et al. (2006, Rev. of Econ. Res. on Copyright) Michel (2006, Topics in Econ. Analysis and Policy) Rob and Waldfogel (2006, J. of Law and Economics) Zentner (2006, Journal of Law and Economics) Bhattacharjee et al. (2007, Management Science) DeVany and Walls (2007, Review of Industrial Organization) Hennig-Thurau, Henning, Sattler (2007, Marketing Science)	Rob and Waldfogel (2007, J. of Industrial Economics) Liebowitz (2008, Management Science) Bender and Wang (2009, Intl. Social Science Review) Danaher et al. (2010, Marketing Science) Waldfogel (2010, Information Econ. and Policy) Bai and Waldfogel (2012, Information Econ. and Policy) Danaher et al. (2013, J. of Industrial Economics) Hong (2013, J. of Applied Econometrics) Danaher and Smith (2014, Intl. J. of Industrial Organization) Ma et al. (2014, Information Systems Research) Adermon and Liang (2014, J. of Econ. Behavior & Organization)


## Does Piracy Hurt Innovation?

- Telang and Waldfogel examine output in Bollywood after introduction of VCR in mid-1980s
- Significant drop in industry revenue, industry output, and quality (IMDB ratings)





### Anti-Piracy Options




### Anti-Piracy Options

Supply-Side **Demand-Side** Government **HADOPI** Graduated Megaupload shutdown increased digital sales 8-10% Response Law increased legal music UK Blocking increased paid sales by 22-25% legal streaming by 12% Industry/ Voluntary Reducing pirated links in search results increases legal consumption

### Pro-Legal (Product)

 Distributing products in digital channels reduces (digital) piracy...



Removing content from iTunes causes an 11% increase in piracy (Danaher et al. 2010)



Adding content to Hulu causes an 18% decrease in piracy (Danaher et al. 2015)

1111111111111111

Studio X & iTunes (2012)



Releasing (catalog movies) on iTunes causes 6.5% decrease in piracy (Smith et al. 2015)

• ...without cannibalizing physical sales

### Pro-Legal (Place)

- Design international release windows with piracy in mind
  - Each 10-day delay between domestic and international DVD release → 2-3% lower sales (Smith and Telang 2014)
- Design product release windows with piracy in mind
  - Releasing digital movies on iTunes 10 days before DVD/BD
    - → 2x digital sales, no change in DVD/BD sales (Danaher, Smith, and Telang 2015)

Does piracy harm sales?

Does piracy hurt creative output?

Do Long Tail markets change consumer preferences?

Does HBO cannibalize DVD sales?

Do site shutdowns change piracy behavior?

What is the right price for online movie sales?

How valuable is targeted promotion online?

Do graduated response efforts increase legal sales?

Do early digital releases cannibalize DVD sales?

Can Google search results change piracy?

Does theatrical attendance help DVD sales? Does legal online streaming hurt EST sales?

Does site blocking change piracy behavior?

Do delayed international DVD releases hurt sales?

Does piracy harm sales?

Does piracy hurt creative output?

Do Long Tail markets change consumer preferences?

Does HBO cannibalize DVD sales?

Is technology to Changing

Do site shutdowns change piracy behavior?
Do gland Ketsepowers in the E

Do early digital releases cannibalize DVD sales?

Does theatrical attendance help DVD sales?

Does legal online streaming hurt EST sales?

Does site blocking change piracy behavior?

Do delayed international DVD releases hurt sales?













>80%







>85%









>50%

### Major Technological Shifts

- User-Generated Content
- Long Tail Markets
- Digital Piracy
- Powerful Online Distributors
- Big Data

### Established Business Model

#### Market Characteristics:

- High fixed cost of production,
- Low marginal cost of reproduction/distribution,
- Scarce channel capacity,
- Possible to control user access to content (via copyright)

#### • Business Model:

- Sell individual products to consumers with different values
- Use release windows/versions targeted to market segments

#### Sources of Market Power:

- Control *scarce* financial/technical resources to produce content
- Control *scarce* channels necessary to distribute content
- Control artificial *scarcity* in how consumers access content

### **Established Business Model**

#### Market Characteristics:

- Low to high fixed cost of production,
- Zero marginal cost of reproduction/distribution,
- "Unlimited" channel capacity,
- Difficult to control user access to content (via copyright)

#### • Business Model:

- Sell individual products to consumers with different values
- Use release windows/versions targeted to market segments

#### Sources of Market Power:

- Control scarce financial/technical resources to produce content
- Control scarce channels necessary to distribute content
- Control artificial scarcity in how consumers access content

### **Established Business Model**

#### Market Characteristics:

- Low to high fixed cost of production,
- Zero marginal cost of reproduction/distribution,
- "Unlimited" channel capacity,
- Difficult to control user access to content (via copyright)

#### • Business Model:

- Sell individual products to consumers with different values
- Use release windows/versions targeted to market segments

#### Sources of Market Power:

- UGC → Control scarce financia
  - Control scarce financial/technical resources to produce content
- Long Tail → Control scarce channels necessary to distribute content
- Piracy → Control artificial scarcity in how consumers access content

### On-Demand Bundled Model

- Market Characteristics:
  - Low to high fixed cost of production,
  - Zero marginal cost of reproduction/distribution,
  - "Unlimited" channel capacity,
  - Difficult to control user access to content (via copyright)
- Business Model:
  - Sell content in massive on-demand subscription bundle
  - Target content based on individual consumer preferences
- Sources of Market Power:
  - Platform scale (larger bundles more profitable than smaller)
  - Data scale (improved recommendations)

### How can leaders respond?

Leverage deep catalogs

### How can leaders respond?

- Leverage deep catalogs
- Studio/Network specific OTT sites...

### How can leaders respond?

- Leverage deep catalogs
- Studio/Network specific OTT sites...
- Independent platform, willing to allow studios to access customer data

## Organize around data analytics

- Example: Harrah's Entertainment
  - Each property operates as independent "fiefdom"
  - (Historically) little data about customers
  - Gut feel management, distributed marketing

### Structural Change

- Gary Loveman, COO
- Centralize data ownership within company
- Centralize analytics function
- Make senior level analytics hires ("propeller heads")

### Cultural Change

"We run everything at Harrah's with control groups. It's like, 'You don't harass women, you don't steal, and you've got to have a control group.' This is one of the things that you can lose your job for at Harrah's—not running a control group."

Gary Loveman, Harrah's

### Data Experimentation

Which offer is more profitable:

- Free room, 2 steak dinners, \$30 in free chips (\$125 value)
- \$60 in chips

### Coda

 When Gary Loveman stepped down in 2013, his loyalty program had 45 million members and was valued at \$1 billion to the company.

## Advantages of centralizing data function

- Data are most useful when linked
- Increases effectiveness of analytics talent
- Makes it easier to retain talent
- Increases objectivity in analysis

### Recommendations

- Centralize data as "C-level" function (e.g., Gary Loveman)
- Change reporting structure (all analytics functions report to single point)
- Change culture ("you don't harass women, you don't steal, and you've got to have a control group...")

#### Thank You

mds@cmu.edu rtelang@andrew.cmu.edu

