

# What Keeps us up at Night?

A Content Sharing Vendor's Threat Models

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CTO, SHIFT



SCREENERS.COM  
BY SHIFT



SafeStream





# Content Leaks

Big hacks and malware infections get a lot of press

- Protection against them is vitally important

Less sophisticated patterns of misuse cause a lot of problems

- Damage to media properties
- Cost of cleanup

Mundane leak scenarios

- Observed as most common leak sources for our customers
- Recent focus on improving detection and response



# Leak Related Questions

A person is seen from behind, looking at a television screen. The screen displays a colorful, abstract graphic with red, blue, and white elements. The text "Leak Related Questions" is overlaid in white on the top half of the image.



# Leak Related Questions

A person is seen from behind, looking at a television screen. The screen displays a colorful, abstract image with red, blue, and white shapes. The person is wearing a dark-colored sweater. The background is a plain wall.

**What is the content?**



# Leak Related Questions

A person with short dark hair, wearing a dark sweater, is seen from behind, looking at a large screen. The screen displays colorful, abstract graphics with red, blue, and purple elements. The background is dimly lit, suggesting an indoor setting like a theater or lecture hall.

## What is the content?

- Is it cultish or nerdy, or has some anticipated reveal?



# Leak Related Questions

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- Have you been doing a good job marketing it? Congrats!



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- Did we lower our guard?



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- On purpose or by accident?



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- For what purpose?



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## What controls did we use when we shared it?

- Did we lower our guard?
- On purpose or by accident?
- For what purpose?
- Who are we making it easy for and why?



# Audience for Pre-release Sharing






# Audience for Pre-release Sharing

Notably:





# Audience for Pre-release Sharing


A woman is shown in profile, looking out towards the right. She is silhouetted against a chain-link fence. The background is a bright, hazy outdoor setting. The woman's hair is pulled back, and she appears to be wearing a dark jacket or sweater. The overall mood is contemplative and focused.

Notably:

- Press Reviewers



# Audience for Pre-release Sharing

A woman is shown in profile, looking out a window. The window has a chain-link fence in front of it. She is holding a camera and some papers. The lighting is dim, creating a moody atmosphere.


Notably:

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Also:



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
- Press Reviewers

Also:

- VIPs of various kinds



# Audience for Pre-release Sharing

A woman is shown in profile, looking out a window. The window has a chain-link fence in front of it. She is holding a camera, and her hands are visible on the keyboard of a laptop. The scene is dimly lit, with light coming from the window, creating a silhouette effect on her face and the camera.

Notably:


- Press Reviewers

Also:

- VIPs of various kinds
- External team members



# Audience for Pre-release Sharing

A woman is shown in profile, looking towards the left. She has dark hair pulled back and is wearing a dark top. In the foreground, a camera is visible, slightly out of focus, with its lens and various attachments. The background is a chain-link fence, and the overall lighting is dim and moody, suggesting an outdoor setting at dusk or dawn.

Notably:

- Press Reviewers

Also:

- VIPs of various kinds
- External team members
- Internal team members doing the sharing



# Audience for Pre-release Sharing

Notably:

- Press Reviewers

Also:

- VIPs of various kinds
- External team members
- Internal team members doing the sharing

**In other words, all kinds of people will have access**



# Our Products



# Our Products

- **Screeners.com** Press screening platform



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- **SafeStream** Real-time watermarking service and API



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# Our Products


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
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# Leak Related Questions (cont)





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- Sometimes they share it on purpose



# Leak Related Questions (cont)

How did the authorized user lose custody?

- Was it shared on purpose? By accident? Without their knowledge?
- Authorized users don't usually pirate it directly
- Sometimes they share it on purpose
- "Oversharing"



# Threat 1: Oversharing




# Threat 1: Oversharing

**An authorized user  
intentionally shares access  
with an unauthorized user**



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


Publicist  
(works for studio)

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



# Threat 1: Oversharing



Publicist  
(works for studio)

Authorized  
Share




Reviewer  
(works for newspaper)

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

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
**An authorized user intentionally shares access with an unauthorized user**

Authorized Share



Reviewer  
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
Unauthorized Share



Someone they trust  
(limited affiliation)





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
Authorized Share



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
Unauthorized Share



Someone they trust  
(limited affiliation)



Leak




Someone that person likes  
(no loyalty)



# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*





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
Authorized Share



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
Unauthorized Share



Someone they trust

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Leak



Someone that person likes

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

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Publicist

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
Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)


Unauthorized  
Share



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)

Leak



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)



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


Publicist

(works for studio)

How are they even able to do this?

Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)


Unauthorized  
Share



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)

Leak



Someone that person likes

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# Threat 1: Oversharing

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


Publicist

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How are they even able to do this?

- They give them the password, "Maybe I'll change it later"





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


Publicist

(works for studio)

How are they even able to do this?

- They give them the password, "Maybe I'll change it later"
- LET'S ELIMINATE PASSWORDS!





# Threat 1: Oversharing

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
Publicist

(works for studio)

How are they even able to do this?

- They give them the password, "Maybe I'll change it later"
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- They forward emails

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)


Unauthorized Share



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(limited affiliation)

Leak



Someone that person likes

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
Code Name: "*The Lover*"



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)


Unauthorized  
Share



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)

Leak



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)

How are they even able to do this?

- They give them the password, "Maybe I'll change it later"
  - LET'S ELIMINATE PASSWORDS!
- They forward emails
- They download/rip and share the file




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
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
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


Publicist

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


Magic login link only - No password to forward




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
(works for studio)



Magic login link only - No password to forward



MFA requirement settable by content




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
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Publicist


(works for studio)

- ✓ Magic login link only - No password to forward
- ✓ MFA requirement settable by content
- ✓ Visible watermark to raise paranoia




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



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(limited affiliation)



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
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
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Visible watermark to raise paranoia




Forensic watermark to track down the leaky workflow and user



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)




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Magic login link only - No password to forward



MFA requirement settable by content



Visible watermark to raise paranoia



Forensic watermark to track down the leaky workflow and user




DRM to complicate downloading and ripping



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)




# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*



Publicist

(works for studio)



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Magic login link only - No password to forward



MFA requirement settable by content



Visible watermark to raise paranoia



Forensic watermark to track down the leaky workflow and user



DRM to complicate downloading and ripping




NDA or other contract(s) and training to not share



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)




# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*




Publicist

(works for studio)




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)



# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*




Publicist

(works for studio)




Magic login link only - No password to forward




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)



# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*



Publicist


(works for studio)



Magic login link only - No password to forward



MFA requirement settable by content




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)



# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*



Publicist

(works for studio)




Magic login link only - No password to forward



MFA requirement settable by content




Visible watermark to **increase anonymization work for a leaker**




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)




# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*



Publicist

(works for studio)



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Magic login link only - No password to forward




MFA requirement settable by content



Visible watermark to **increase anonymization work for a leaker**




Forensic watermark to track down the leaky workflow and user



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)




# Threat 1: Oversharing

Code Name: *"The Lover"*



Publicist

(works for studio)



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Magic login link only - No password to forward



MFA requirement settable by content



Visible watermark to **increase anonymization work for a leaker**



Forensic watermark to track down the leaky workflow and user




DRM to complicate downloading and ripping



Someone they trust

(limited affiliation)



Someone that person likes

(no loyalty)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials




# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

**An unauthorized user has standing access or can gain access to an authorized user's credentials**



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials




Publicist

(works for studio)

**An unauthorized user has standing access or can gain access to an authorized user's credentials**





# Threat 2: Stored Credentials



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized  
Share




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

**An unauthorized user has standing access or can gain access to an authorized user's credentials**





# Threat 2: Stored Credentials



Publicist


(works for studio)

Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)




Authorized  
User's  
Secondary  
Device



An unauthorized user has standing access or can gain access to an authorized user's credentials



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials





Publicist

(works for studio)

An unauthorized user has standing access or can gain access to an authorized user's credentials


Authorized Share




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Authorized User's Secondary Device




Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)







# Threat 2: Stored Credentials



Publicist


(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak




Any random person  
(bad decisions)

An unauthorized user has standing access or can gain access to an authorized user's credentials



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*





Publicist

(works for studio)

An unauthorized user has standing access or can gain access to an authorized user's credentials

Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Any random person  
(bad decisions)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials


Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist


(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)




Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*


How does this device even have access?



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Any random person  
(bad decisions)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*

How does this device even have access?


- Passwords, ugh



Publicist


(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*

How does this device even have access?


- Passwords, ugh
  - Devices save them!



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Any random person  
(bad decisions)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*

How does this device even have access?


- Passwords, ugh
  - Devices save them!
  - People reuse them! Share them!



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

Someone who knows them

Any random person

(works for newspaper)

(family, friend, acquaintance)

(bad decisions)

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*


How does this device even have access?



Publicist


(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)

- Passwords, ugh
  - Devices save them!
  - People reuse them! Share them!
  - Family and friends know their 4- or 6-digit passcode and password habits



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*


How does this device even have access?



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Someone who knows them

(family, friend, acquaintance)

Any random person

(bad decisions)

- Passwords, ugh
  - Devices save them!
  - People reuse them! Share them!
  - Family and friends know their 4- or 6-digit passcode and password habits
  - We can't change any of the above

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials


Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist


(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)




Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)



Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)

How does this device even have access?

- Passwords, ugh
  - Devices save them!
  - People reuse them! Share them!
  - Family and friends know their 4- or 6-digit passcode and password habits
  - We can't change any of the above

**LET'S ELIMINATE PASSWORDS!**



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials


Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

Someone who knows them

Any random person

(works for newspaper)

(family, friend, acquaintance)

(bad decisions)

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*




Publicist

(works for studio)




Magic login link only - **No password to store**

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)




Magic login link only - **No password to store**



MFA requirement settable by content

Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Someone who knows them

(family, friend, acquaintance)

Any random person

(bad decisions)

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials



Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Magic login link only - **No password to store**



MFA requirement settable by content



Device registration - Must expire in days or weeks

Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials


Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials




Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Visible watermark to remind leaker of authorized party

Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials



Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Visible watermark to remind leaker of authorized party



Visible watermark to increase anonymization work for a leaker

Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)

# Threat 2: Stored Credentials

Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)



Visible watermark to **remind leaker of authorized party**




Visible watermark to **increase anonymization work for a leaker**



Forensic watermark to track down the leaky workflow and user

Authorized Share



Authorized User's Secondary Device



Leak



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Any random person  
(bad decisions)



# Threat 2: Stored Credentials



Code Name: *"The Stale iPad"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Visible watermark to **remind leaker of authorized party**



Visible watermark to **increase anonymization work for a leaker**



Forensic watermark to track down the leaky workflow and user




DRM to complicate downloading and ripping

Authorized User's Secondary Device



Someone who knows them  
(family, friend, acquaintance)

Leak



Any random person  
(bad decisions)


# Threat 3: Account Compromise



# Threat 3: Account Compromise

**An unauthorized user  
compromises the email account  
of an authorized user**

# Threat 3: Account Compromise




Publicist

(works for studio)

**An unauthorized user  
compromises the email account  
of an authorized user**





# Threat 3: Account Compromise



Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized  
Share




Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

**An unauthorized user  
compromises the email account  
of an authorized user**



# Threat 3: Account Compromise



Publicist


(works for studio)

Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)




Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

An unauthorized user  
compromises the email account  
of an authorized user





# Threat 3: Account Compromise



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share




Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

An unauthorized user  
compromises the email account  
of an authorized user

# Threat 3: Account Compromise



Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

An unauthorized user  
compromises the email account  
of an authorized user



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

# Threat 3: Account Compromise

Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*


Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)



# Threat 3: Account Compromise

Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*


Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family

# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share

A thick blue arrow pointing downwards from the Publicist to the Reviewer.

Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share

A thick yellow arrow pointing diagonally from the Publicist to the Email Attacker.

Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies

# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

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- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)


# Threat 3: Account Compromise

Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*




Publicist

(works for studio)



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)

Physical factor: U2F (YubiKey)



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)

Physical factor: U2F (YubiKey)

- Hard to share, beyond a shared device

# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)

Physical factor: U2F (YubiKey)

- Hard to share, beyond a shared device
- Hard to steal




# Threat 3: Account Compromise

Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)



Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)

Physical factor: U2F (YubiKey)

- Hard to share, beyond a shared device
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies (iOS is behind)

# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)

Physical factor: U2F (YubiKey)

- Hard to share, beyond a shared device
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies (iOS is behind)




# Threat 3: Account Compromise

Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)



Today's best available defense against account compromise is MFA

Biometrics: TouchID, FaceID, Face Unlock

- Hard to share widely, beyond family
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies
- Quality varies (iOS is ahead)

Physical factor: U2F (YubiKey)

- Hard to share, beyond a shared device
- Hard to steal
- Availability varies (iOS is behind)

Our industry might have to do both

# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)



# Threat 3: Account Compromise

Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*




Publicist

(works for studio)



MFA requirement settable by content


Authorized  
Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to  
Authorized  
Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

# Threat 3: Account Compromise

Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist


(works for studio)



MFA requirement settable by content



TOTP (Google Authenticator type) MFA available





# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

- ✓ MFA requirement settable by content
- ✓ TOTP (Google Authenticator type) MFA available
- ✓ U2F coming soon



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


Code Name: *"You've got pwned"*



Publicist

(works for studio)

- ✓ MFA requirement settable by content
- ✓ TOTP (Google Authenticator type) MFA available
- ✓ U2F coming soon
- ✓ Biometric coming soon (iOS first)





# Threat 3: Account Compromise


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Publicist

(works for studio)


Authorized Share



Reviewer

(works for newspaper)

Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)

- ✓ MFA requirement settable by content
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- ✓ U2F coming soon
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- ✓ DRM to complicate downloading and ripping

# Threat 3: Account Compromise


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


Reviewer

(works for newspaper)



Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)



MFA requirement settable by content



TOTP (Google Authenticator type) MFA available



U2F coming soon



Biometric coming soon (iOS first)



DRM to complicate downloading and ripping



Anomalous activity monitoring - Watchmen service



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


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


Reviewer

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Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

(no loyalty)



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DRM to complicate downloading and ripping



Anomalous activity monitoring - Watchmen service

Too many devices

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
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Publicist

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


Reviewer

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Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

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Too many devices  
Too many locations



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


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


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Too many devices  
Too many locations  
Odd locations

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
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Publicist

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Authorized Share




Reviewer

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Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

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Too many devices

Too many locations

Odd locations

Simultaneous viewing from multiple devices



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


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


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Too many devices

Too many locations

Odd locations

Simultaneous viewing from multiple devices

Watching too much content

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
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Publicist

(works for studio)

Authorized Share




Reviewer

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Access to Authorized Share



Email Attacker

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Too many devices

Too many locations

Odd locations

Simultaneous viewing from multiple devices

Watching too much content

Watching all the same content twice from two devices



# Threat 3: Account Compromise


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


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Too many devices

Too many locations

Odd locations

Simultaneous viewing from multiple devices

Watching too much content

Watching all the same content twice from two devices

Etc. and the list is growing



# Thank you!

And remember to share safely

Alex Nauda  
CTO, SHIFT



SCREENERS.COM  
BY SHIFT

